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Abstract—Ad hoc networks enable communication between
distributed, mobile wireless nodes without any supporting in-
frastructure. In the absence of centralized control, such networks
require node interaction, and are inherently based on cooperation
between nodes. In this paper, we use social and behavioral
trust of nodes to form a flow allocation optimization problem.
We initialize trust using information gained from users’ social
relationships (from social networks) and update the trusts metric
over time based on observed node behaviors. We conduct analysis
of social trust using real data sets and used it as a parameter for
performance evaluation of our frame work in ns-3. Based on our
approach we obtain a significant improvement in both detection
rate and packet delivery ratio using social trust information when
compared to behavioral trust alone. Further, we observe that
social trust is critical in the event of mobility and plays a crucial
role in bootstrapping the computation of trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks consist of wireless nodes, such as sensors,
tablet computers, and smart phones, operating in the absence
of supporting infrastructure. Due to the lack of a centralized
authority, each node relies on its neighbors to identify multi-
hop routes to its destination and forward packets along each
route. At the same time, the intermediate nodes may exhibit
selfish behavior by dropping packets in order to conserve
scarce bandwidth and device resources. Furthermore, ad hoc
networks may be deployed in the presence of malicious nodes,
who join the network by masquerading as valid nodes and
selectively drop, reroute, or tamper with packets [1].
A common approach to mitigating selfish and malicious
activity in ad hoc networks is through trust management [2]. In
a trust management system, each node observes the behavior
of each of its neighbors over a period of time and records
instances of suspicious behavior, such as packet dropping,
failure to follow MAC layer protocols, and broadcasting inac-
curate routing information. The nodes then form an empirical
estimate of each neighbor’s trustworthiness, denoted as a trust
metric. By aggregating trust metric data from multiple nodes
in a distributed fashion, each node can compute a global metric
for the trustworthiness of each other network node, based on a
combination of firsthand observation and reports from others.
Successful deployment of a trust management system car-
ries several requirements. First, the nodes must have a mech-
anism for determining whether packet drops and other suspi-
cious events occur due to node misbehavior or communication
and hardware failures. Second, each node must have sufficient
information to evaluate its neighbors’ trustworthiness, in spite
of mobility and network dynamics. Third, the communication
overhead of the network imposed by exchanging trust infor-
mation must be minimized.
In this paper, our insight is that the network users have
existing social relationships with each other. When trust
relationships between two nodes exist, the nodes will not
exhibit their selfish or malicious behavior. Such values can
be quantified based on cached values of other contexts, in
particular social networks. Social network data may be cached
from online social networks, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and
Orkut, or may come from mobile ad hoc social networks, as
proposed in [3]–[5]. By leveraging the trust data accumulated
through social relationships, a network node can more easily
differentiate between benign failures due to device constraints
and malicious behavior. This reduces the amount of data col-
lection and information exchange required to identify selfish
or malicious nodes. Currently, however, there is no approach
to incorporating social trust information in ad hoc network
operation.
We make two specific contributions: First, we develop
methods for computing trust metrics based on social network
data and composing social and behavioral trust metrics. We
evaluate our trust metrics using experimental Facebook profile
and wall post data. Second, we apply this trust information
into a practical problem of flow allocation in MANETs. To
this end, we propose a distributed optimization approach to
allocating flows among multiple paths based on both network
performance and the trust metrics of each path.
We formulate flow allocation problems for two classes
of utility, namely maximizing throughput and maximizing
weighted flow diversity, and prove that our optimization al-
gorithms lead to optimal flow allocation among trusted paths
subject to capacity constraints. Our approach is implemented
through distributed network protocols and verified through
ns-3 simulation study. Our simulation results show that our
approach provides high throughput and packet delivery even
in the presence of malicious nodes. We obtain a significant
improvement in both detection rate and packet delivery ratio
using social trust information when compared to behavioral
trust alone. Further, we observe that social trust is critical in the
event of mobility (where behavioral values are not available)
and plays a crucial role in bootstrapping the computation of
trust.
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Fig. 1. Simple diagram of an ad-hoc network. Six nodes are connected
ad-hoc with each other via WiFi. Social relationships co-exist amongst some
users.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we state
our system model and definitions of social network trust.
Our proposed trust-based optimization framework and flow
allocation protocols are described in Section IV. Simulation
results are provided in Section V. Related work is reviewed
in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATION
Wireless communications and Internet have become com-
monplace and have completely transformed the social lives of
people. Social networking sites such as Facebook (with over
800 million users), Google+, LinkedIn, Orkut (India, Brazil)
and Renren (Chinese) have changed the paradigm of adoles-
cent mating rituals, political activism, corporate management
styles, classroom teaching and other dimensions of social life.
In other words, social networking has made people more social
inside the ‘net’, than perhaps outside, in the real-world. This
trend is on the increase.
More and more people are using these websites for social
interactions and keeping others updated about themselves. Tra-
ditionally, people used these ‘connections’ for communicating
message from one person to another. People would leverage
this social trust on one-another to communicate mails/letters
or parcels to another person. In earlier times, if A is going
to some city B, his friends will give him any parcels or
mails/letters to their acquaintances in that place. Now, social
relationships, being formed in online communities, we explore
if these online social relationships can similarly help us
in better ‘communication’ amongst ourselves. Basically, we
explore a converse question: Can social relationships affect
the way wireless nodes interact with each other?
Consider the scenario given in Fig 1. The active links
between wireless devices are as shown in the figure. The
social relationships between users are shown by green or red
connections. It can be observed in this case that B has a
good relationship with A and C, but poor relationship with
D. Therefore, D may drop a packet forwarded by B. Thus,
poor social trust values are an indicative of ‘selfish’ node
behavior and higher social trust values will oblige a node to
properly route the packets of another node. Such trust values
may be derived from a direct relationship between the users,
a relationship with a mutual acquaintance, membership in the
same organization, or from online social network data. Unlike
TABLE I
PARAMETERS USED IN BEHAVIORAL TRUST CALCULATION
Field Description Value
α=α1 evidence of good behavior
count
Integer
β=β1 evidence of bad behavior
count
Integer
b belief about the nodes ac-
tion (trust)
α(1− u)/(α + β)
d disbelief about the nodes
action (distrust=1-trust)
β(1− u)/(α + β)
u uncertainty on the nodes
trust calculations
12× V ar(beta(α, β))
behavioral trust, social trust values exist independent of the
ad hoc network, and are therefore not sensitive to changes in
network topology or communication link failures. These social
relationships in fact allow us to compute social trust values
which empower ad hoc networks for rapid deployment.
In this paper, we consider a network where ad hoc nodes
in ad hoc networks are member of social networks. Such
combined networks are under active research consideration
these days. CenseMe where mobile phones create mobile
sensor networks and share the sensed information in social
networks (Facebook) is one architecture in this direction. [?],
[3], [5] implement social networks for ad hoc nodes.
Use of trust relationships in this combined network ad-
dresses two challenges. First, based on the behavioral trust
on the user, we can determine (probabilistically), whether the
packet drop is because of random failure (in case of high
trust value), or due to malicious behavior. Secondly, although
mobility may obstruct behavioral trust computation, social
trust can be calculated based on existing social relationships
between users and ease trust assessment.
III. TRUST COMPUTATION
As we mentioned earlier, trust is computed as a combination
of behavioral and social trust values.
A. Calculation of behavioral trust
Behavioral trust is measured by observing the behavior
(actions) of one-hop neighbors. Behavioral trust is context-
based and depends on the operational environment. The ob-
servational evidences αo (positive evidence) and βo (negative
evidence) are collected based on the neighbors’ actions (be-
haviors).
We illustrate the evidence based behavioral trust calculation
by using the following example. Let us consider a packet
routing scenario in a MANET and let node ‘j’ is a target node
(trustee node) whose trust has to be calculated. All neighboring
nodes within one hop proximity of j can overhear both the
incoming packets and the outgoing packets at j. The routing
table is pre-agreed upon and available at every node and hence
a neighboring node of j can easily identify the right destination
for each packet. These neighboring nodes (trustor nodes) can
check the destination of each outgoing packet from node j and
compare the destination against the routing table available with
them. If the packet advances towards the right destination as
3per the routing table, then the routing behavior of the trustee
node is considered to be correct and trustor can increment the
αo evidence on the trustee. If the packet does not get routed,
gets corrupted or modified, or gets routed along an incorrect
path, then the experience is recorded as a misbehavior βo
evidence on the trustee node. Here we assume that the trustor
node can observe both the incoming and outgoing packets at
trustee node.
If all transmissions are kept constant at pre-decided power
levels (P0), the trustor nodes can reasonably estimate the re-
ceived signal strength (RSS) and signal-to-noise (SNR) values
at trustee node to back-calculate approximate channel and
hence packet loss rate (plr). Genuine packet loss rate(PLR)
due to channel losses can be approximated as:
PLR = plr × (α0 + β0)
We can adjust α and β values to account for packet loss as
follows:
α1 = α0 + PLR , β1 = β0 − PLR
Determination of trust based on behavior: The observed
evidence values α1 and β1 are used as parameters of a Beta
distribution as follows:
P (x) = B(α1, β1, x) =
Γ(α1 + β1)
Γ(α1)Γ(β1)
xα1−1(1− x)β1−1 (1)
where Γ(.) is the Gamma function. Now the trust opinion
will be generated as a triplet < b, d, u >, where b stands
for node’s belief that the neighbor will behave properly in
next time, d is the node’s disbelief of good behavior and u
is the uncertainty of the opinion. The expectation of the beta
distribution ( α1/(α1+β1)), is used to derive b and d and the
variance (V ar(t) = α1β1/(α1+β1)2(α1+β1+1)), normalized
by factor 12 is used to derive u as shown in Table. I. This belief
value b is used as behavioral trust in our work.
We validate this trust model using empirical simulations.
A scenario of 40 nodes deployed over a square region of
100X100 m was assumed. Ad hoc On-demand Multipath
Distance Vector (AOMDV) routing algorithm is used for
packet forwarding [6]. The behavior was averaged over 100
realizations. Our focus is on testing the effectiveness of our
Trust Model, i.e., convergence and accuracy of the trust
calculation in determining the exact value of trust. From Fig. 2
we can see that on an average our approach converges to the
correct trust value of these nodes in 14 event observations.
The initial trust is always less due to uncertainty factor (u)
which is high in the initial stage. However, as the number of
evidences increases the uncertainty slowly reduces and hence
the trust value converges to its original value.
B. Calculation of social trust
As we have seen before, the convergence of behavioral
trust takes certain time. If we need to make the trust decision
quickly or if we cannot observe the one hop behaviors, we
can use social media and derive trust based on social profiles
of users.
Here, we are assuming that modes in adhoc network have
access to a social network. This may not always be true and
we may have to revert to behavioral trust only formulation
in those scenarios. However, many mobile social networks
such as Adsocial [4] or MobiSN [3] are emerging lately.
AdSocial targets small-scale scenarios such as co-workers
sharing calendar information. In one scenario, 30+ users used
AdSocial to call each other from room to room, chat, and
keep track of users location in the hotel [4]. More often than
that, people are inter-connected using social networks such as
Facebook or Google+. The offline, cached information from
such networks can be used to obtain social trust value. In
this paper, we demonstrate this with some scenario specific to
Facebook users, although the analysis is generic.
A typical user profile in an on-line social network is
characterized by its profile features like location, hometown,
activities, interests, favorite music, professional associations,
etc. In sites like Facebook and Orkut, users establish connec-
tivity and then friendships when they discover similar profile
entries. In LinkedIn people connect amongst each other to
build professional networks if they find profiles match in terms
of affiliations, qualifications and work. It implies that people
tend to make social connection with certain trust level if they
find a person of similar profile in terms of features. Similarly,
people interact more only when they find that the person is
socially reliable to an extent. That means, the frequent social
interaction can be used to derive trust.
There can be various measures of social trust amongst
two users based on information obtained from online social
networks. We demonstrate the concept using inter-profile
similarity and wall post interactions of users. In a nut shell, if
a user meets a strange person and receives information from
a stranger, as long as the person is similar in terms of either
location, interests, and other related features, then he tends to
trust that person more. Also, a person continues to interact
and exchange data with a person only with a trusted person.
With this hypothesis we follow the below steps in obtaining
the social trust
• If the two users are not connected socially (e.g., not
friends in Facebook) than their inter profile similarity
factor (IPS) will provide an estimate of social trust.
• If the users are already socially connected (for example if
they are friends in Facebook) then their relative frequency
of wall post interactions will reflect the trust level. More
frequent wall posting with a particular user compared to
all other users, will translate to higher trust and fewer
postings will translate to lower trust.
• If the users are social connected and also frequently in-
teracts then the combinations of their IPS and interaction
factor will provide the social trust value.
Inter Profile Similarity (IPS): Inter profile similarity is
defined as how similar two users are in terms of various
semantics (metrics). The IPS is measured in the interval of (0,
1) where 1 denotes complete similarity and 0 denotes complete
dissimilarity. Our IPS is measured using natural language
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Fig. 2. Packet routing based behavioral trust calcu-
lation for three actual trust values (results based on
ns-3 simulation)
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Fig. 3. Sample social trust computation using
Wallpost interactions of Facebook users [7]. Trust
values stablize over a period of few months.
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Fig. 4. Improvement in trust computation using
social information (from Facebook data [7]). Only
4 events are sufficient to estimate trust value (as
against 10-14)
processing (NLP) inspired by reference [8]. IPS compares
short text phrases between two profiles. The benefit of using
NLP is that the different words used in the profile which has
same meaning will be identified correctly. The learning process
of the NLP also keep improving with the available data size.
In our work we use the social network data such as Face-
book and Orkut as an illustrative examples for measuring the
IPS factor. We assume that the profiles in social networks are
described using a set of key words and we have access to those
profile details. Facebook allows users to describe themselves
in a number of different categories; however, we concentrate
only on the following features: (1) activities, (2) interests, (3)
gender, and (4) affiliations. Using the affiliations, users are
able to restrict the set of people that can view their profile,
the default policy is that only those in the same affiliation
or are immediate friends may view each other’s profiles. We
chose to focus on these categories as they generally use terms
that exist in a dictionary. These semantics have been analyzed
and an IPS score of 0 to 1 calculated based on the algorithm
proposed in [8] for each features. If the IPS score is above 0.5
then we increase the positive evidence count (αs) or else we
increment the negative evidence count (βs). Now using these
αs and βs we can determine the social trust as follows:
Ii,j(t) is trust of i on j computed at time t based on Inter-
profile similarity. It is computed using a Beta distribution
similar to behavioral trust.
Ii,j(t) =
αs
(αs + βs)
(1− u), where u = 12×Var(B(αs, βs))
(2)
Similarity in user affiliations form the most important like-
lihood of user support in MANETs in absence of direct
relationship amongst users. In case, such relationship exists,
we infer social trust based on wall post interactions.
Trust based on wall post interactions: In this section
we derive the social trust based on the interactions in social
networks. The social trust is derived based on the frequency
of data exchanges between users. We use the hypothesis that
activities (frequent data exchanges between users) generally
represent a strong relationship in the social network and
hence a strong trust. For illustration purposes we use wall
post exchange in Facebook as the method of interactions. We
analyze the distribution of the number of wall posts per link
and investigate to what extent a user i exchanges wall posts
with a particular user j compared to all other users. Let us
assume Wi,j(t) is trust of i on j at time t based on wall-post
interactions. It is computed as follows:
Wi,j(t) = 1− e
−ax(t) (3)
where,
x(t) = Ni,j(t)
1(
Ni(t)
C
)
where Ni,j(t) is the number of accumulated wall posts by
i on j’s wall up to time t, Ni(t) is the total number of wall
posts by i up to time t and C is the total number of contacts
(friends) of node i. Therefore, Ni(t)
C
gives the average wall
post rate of i.
To analyze our proposed interactions based trust, we use
the data set given by [7], [9]. This is a wall post data between
September 26, 2006 and January 22nd, 2009 collected in the
Facebook network of New Orleans region. Each wall post
entry in the data set contains information about the wall owner,
the user who made the post, the time at which the post was
made (based on Unix time stamp), and the post content. The
data is wall postings of 60, 290 (66.7%) users and 838, 092
wall posts, in New Orleans networks.
Calculated trust based on wall postings against the time in
months is shown in Fig. 3. The number of wall posts varies
randomly against time. However, from Fig. 3 we observe that,
based on our approach we can able to make the trust decision
within 3 months of interactions. That means a person has
enough interactions within 3 months of time to achieve full
trust (trust=1).
The net social trust on j by i at time t (Si,j(t)) is computed
as weighted average of the IPS and wall-Post trust values:
Si,j(t) = η(t)×Wi,j(t) + (1− η(t)) × Ii,j(t) (4)
where 0 ≤ η(t) ≤ 1 is a time dependent proportionality
constant. As we can see from the wall post data results, on
an average it takes few months of interactions to place a full
5trust on a person. Therefore, in the initial stage, it is better
to give more weight to the IPS based trust than a wall post
interaction based trust. Hence, η(t) should assume a less value
in the initial time and should increase as a function of both
time and the activity factor (total number of wall posts the
person shares with all other users).
C. Computation of Overall Trust
The overall trust metric is computed as a function of both
social trust and observed behavior. The trust of node i for
node j is represented by Tij ∈ [0, 1], which represents the
probability that node j is trustworthy based on information
available to node i. We model Tij as an unknown system
parameter that is estimated based on the observed events,
denoted O1, . . . , On, using log likelihood analysis. The prior
distribution of Tij is derived from social trust. We have
Tij = arg max
x∈[0,1]
Fij(x|O1, . . . , On)
= arg max
x∈[0,1]
Fij(O1, . . . , Om|x)Fij(x) (5)
where Fij is the probability density function of Tij , derived
using the social trust values. We take the IPS metric as an
example, leading to a Beta distribution for Fij defined by
Fij(x) = x
α−1(1 − T )β−1/B(α, β). Under this model, Tij
is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assuming a Beta distribution for Fij(T ), the
trust metric computed based on observed events O1, . . . , On
is equal to
Tij =
r + α− 1
n+ α+ β − 2
(6)
where r is the number of positive events.
Proof: From (5), Tij is chosen to maximize
Fij(O1, . . . , On|x)Fij(x) = x
r(1− x)n−rxα−1(1− x)β−1
which is equivalent to maximizing
(r + α− 1) logx+ (n− r + β − 1) log (1− x)
since the log function is monotonic. Setting the derivative
equal to zero implies that the maximum is achieved when
Tij =
r+α−1
n+α+β−2 .
Intuitively, Proposition 1 states that node i’s trust for node
j is the number of positive observations (from both social
and behavioral trust) normalized by the total number of social
and behavioral observations. Computation of Tij(n + 1), the
observed trust after n+1 observations, can be performed using
a simple linear update rule, where n′ = α+β−2 can be stored
as a static system parameter:
Tij(n+ 1) =
{
Tij(n)
n+n′
n+n′+1 , if On+1 is negative
Tij(n)(n+n
′)+1
n+n′+1 , if On+1 is positive
(7)
Furthermore, note that if there are no social trust data
available, then the update rule (7) is equal to the fraction of
positive observations, as above.
Letting T ∗j denote the true probability of negative behavior
by node j, the mean-square error of the trust computation
is given by E((Tij(n) − T ∗j )2). The mean-square error is
described by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that each observation of node j is positive
with probability T ∗j and negative otherwise, and suppose that,
based on social trust data, the prior distribution of node j’s
behavior is a Beta distribution with parameters α and β.
Define n′ = α+ β − 2 and T ′j = α−1α+β−2 . Then
E((Tij(n)− T
∗
j )
2) =
nT ∗j (1 − T
∗
j ) + n
′2(T ∗j − T
′
j)
(n+ n′)2
(8)
Proof: Let r be a random variable denoting the number
of positive observations. We have
E((Tij(n)− T
∗
j )
2) = E
((
r + α− 1
n+ n′
− p
)2)
(9)
= E
((
r + T ′jn
′
n+ n′
− p
)2)
(10)
Simplifying further, using the fact that r is binomial with
E(r) = nT ∗j and E(r2) = nT ∗j (1 − T ∗j ) + n2T ∗2j , yields
the desired result.
The trust formulation doesn’t involve any specific overhead
in network transmissions because social trust values are com-
puted using offline social networks data (although they can
be updated if needed) while behavioral trust on peer node is
calculated using passive monitoring.
IV. TRUST-BASED FLOW ALLOCATION
We demonstrate the use/ advantage of social trust values
using the example of flow allocation in MANETs. We present
a trust-based flow allocation optimization and a distributed
solution approach.
A. System Model
We assume a set of users that communicate over a wireless
network. A wireless link (i, j) exists between users i and j
if j is within i’s wireless range; let L denote the set of links.
Each link l ∼ (i, j) has a nonnegative capacity cl.
Two (not necessarily disjoint) subsets S,D ⊆ V of users
act as data sources and destinations, respectively. Each source
s ∈ S sends unicast traffic to a destination, denoted ds ∈ D,
with rate rs. When ds is not an immediate neighbor of s,
s maintains a set of paths, denoted Ps, using an ad hoc
routing protocol [10]. Each path pi ∈ Ps consists of a set of
intermediate links, so that pi = {(s, i1), . . . , (ik, ds)}. Letting
rs,pi denote the rate of traffic from source s through path
pi, flow conservation and capacity requirements imply the
following constraints:∑
pi∈l,s∈S
rs,pi ≤ cl ∀l ∈ L (11)
∑
pi∈Ps
rs,pi = rs ∀s ∈ S (12)
6where {pi ∈ l} denotes the set of paths that include l ∈ L
as an intermediate link.
B. Adversary Model
We assume two types of users in the network, benign and
malicious. Benign users who are not source nodes attempt
to maximize the global utility by forwarding all packets they
receive. Benign users who are also source nodes forward all
packets they receive, and attempt to maximize their source rate
using any residual capacity. We assume that benign users have
access to cached social network data that is used to compute
social trust metrics. Malicious users, on the other hand, attempt
to reduce the throughput of one or more sources. This can be
done when the malicious users lie on a source-destination path,
and can drop or re-order packets.
C. Verifying user identities
The use of social trust data by node i to determine the
trustworthiness of node j can be thwarted if a selfish or
malicious user masquerades as a user trusted by i. This can
be incorporated into trust metrics by asking a set of nodes,
denoted R(j), to vouch for j’s true identity, as described by
the following metric.
Definition 1. The identity spoofing metric ISM(i, j) for link
(i, j) is defined to be the probability that at least one of the
users in Rj is valid, given by
ISM(i, j) = 1−
∏
r∈Rj
(1− Ti,rISM(i, r)) (13)
where Ti,r is the combined trust factor of i on r (combina-
tion of social and behavioral trust), and ISM(i, r) is the trust
of i on r’s identity. It is assumed that i has independently
verified the identity of at least one user, j, resulting in
ISM(i, j) = 1. This independence assumption is required to
maintain a basic level of trust on each other’s identity which is
then propagated using combined trust metric (Ti,r). The values
of ISM(i, j′), for all j′ ∈ V , can then be computed using the
fully-trusted users as a starting point. In (13), Ti,rISM(i, r)
is the probability that a node r’s claim of node j’s identity
is trustworthy, equal to the probability that r is a trustworthy
user (Ti,r) times the probability that r’s identity is correct
(ISM(i, r)). We observe that, if one of the nodes in Rj is
fully trusted (Ti,r = ISM(i, r) = 1), then ISM(i, j) = 1 in
(13).
D. Computing path trust
A path is trusted if and only if each link in the path is
trusted. Assuming that the trustworthiness of each node j in
the path is independent of the trustworthiness of the other
nodes in the path, the probability that the path on the whole
is trustworthy is therefore equal to the product of the metric
values for each node in the path.
Definition 2. Let pi = (i0, . . . , in), where i0 = s and in = d,
denote a path between a source s and a destination d. The path
trust metric T (pi) is equal to the product of the probabilities
that each intermediate node in the path is trustworthy,
Tpi =
n−1∏
k=0
Tikik+1 (14)
Each source can compute the trust in the path by piggy-
backing trust values on routing control packets.
E. Problem formulation
Two utility functions are considered. In the first, the goal of
each source destination pair (s, d) is to maximize the available
throughput. This can be expressed by choosing the utility
function U (1)sd (rs), defined as
U
(1)
sd (rs) =
∑
pi∈Ps
log (1 + rs,pi) (15)
In the second, the goal is to divide the flow among multiple
paths, giving extra weight to the paths with higher trust value.
This goal of flow diversity is captured by the utility function
U
(2)
sd (rs) =
∑
pi∈Ps
−
rs,pi
Tpi
log
rspi
Tpi
(16)
The utility function can also be a combination incorporating
both throughput and diversity, with Usd(rs) = U (1)sd (rs) +
µsU
(2)
sd (rs), where µs is a nonnegative constant that can be
tuned to change the relative importance of each term. Next, we
state the optimization problem for multiple source-destination
pairs. First, the flow through each link l cannot exceed the
link capacity constraint cl. Second, each path must meet a
trust threshold τT . Third, each path must meet a threshold on
the probability that no identities have been spoofed, denoted
τS . This results in the following optimization problem
max
∑
s∈S Usd(rs)
rspi
s.t.
∑
s∈S Wsrs ≤ c
rs,pi = 0 if
∏
(i,j)∈pi Ti,j < τT , ∀s ∈ S, pi ∈ s
(17)
where Ws is the routing matrix for source s, (i, j)-entry is
1 if link i is traversed by path j and 0 otherwise, while c is
the vector of link capacities.
Eq. (17) is a concave optimization problem, and can there-
fore be solved efficiently by a centralized authority. In practice,
however, no such centralized authority exists, and Ti,j changes
over time. We instead propose a distributed approach as
explained below.
F. Distributed algorithm
The utility function in (17) is the sum of the utility functions
of each source s, each of which is a concave function
of the source rates. Distributed algorithms can therefore be
found using dual decomposition methods [11]. The following
analysis is based on the utility function Usd, but also holds
for U (1)sd and U
(2)
sd .
7The Lagrangian of (17) is given by
L(r, λ) =
∑
s
Usd(rs)− λ
T
(∑
s
Wsrs − c
)
(18)
Let g(λ) = maxr L(r, λ). g(λ) can be decomposed as
g(λ) =
∑
s∈S
max
r
{Usd(rs)− λ
TWsrs} (19)
Thus g(λ) can be computed if each node independently
solves the problem
maximize Usd(rs)− λTWsrs
rs
(20)
Since U (i)sd is concave, rs can be determined efficiently by each
s ∈ S.
Since (17) is upper bounded by
minimize g(λ)
s.t. λ ≥ 0
(21)
and since g(λ) can be obtained for given λ, it remains
to find the optimum value of λ (i.e., λ∗) satisfying (21).
By maximizing (18) with λ = λ∗, the optimum solution r
satisfying (17) can then be found.
g(λ) is the pointwise maximum of a set of convex functions,
and is therefore convex. Hence g(λ) can be minimized using
subgradient methods, in which at each time step t g(λ) is
updated by setting
λl(t+ 1) = λl(t)−
t0
t
(
cl −
∑
s∈S
Wsrs
)
(22)
Theorem 1. If each trust value Ti,j converges to a steady-
state value Tˆi,j , then the above algorithm converges to the
solution to (17) with Ti,j = Tˆi,j .
Proof: For each path pi, let Tˆpi =
∏
(i,j)∈pi Ti,j .
Since
∏
(i,j)∈pi Ti,j is a continuous function of the Ti,j’s,∏
(i,j)∈pi Ti,j converges to Tˆpi. Let upi = |Tˆpi − τT | > 0, then
there exists Kpi sufficiently large that, after the Kpi-th iteration,
|Tˆpi −
∏
(i,j)∈pi Ti,j | < upi. Hence after the K-th iteration,
where K = maxKpi, the routing matrix is fixed, and the
subgradient algorithm converges to the global optimum [12].
Note that if Tˆpi = τT , then it is impossible to bound Tˆpi away
from τT , and so the trust value may oscillate infinitely around
the threshold and thus fail to converge.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, an ns-3 [13] evaluation of our proposed flow
control approach is described.
A. Simulation Setup/ system model
We make some assumptions about the nodes and malicious
nodes:
1) All nodes could operate in promiscuous mode for neigh-
bor monitoring and behavioral trust computation.
2) All links are bidirectional and all nodes use omni-
directional transceivers.
3) Misbehaving nodes may be selfish (i.e. refuse to for-
ward the packets of other users with probability p) or
maliciously spoof the identity of socially trusted nodes.
However, they can’t obtain any certificates to verify their
identities.
4) The network is a multi-hop network.
5) A malicious node will have low social trust with other
users. This is justified because a user with high social
trust will not behave maliciously to protect his social
relationships/ reputation. Of course, he may act mali-
ciously/ selfishly to nodes with whom he has low social
trust.
6) All nodes are assumed to have access to social network
data.
A network of 70 nodes was simulated, with initial node
positions chosen uniformly at random from a rectangular
region of area 1500m x 1500m. Static network topologies
as well as a random waypoint mobility model with node
speeds varying from 1 m/s to 5 m/s were considered. A free-
space path loss propagation model was assumed, resulting in
each node having a radio range of approximately 400m. IEEE
802.11a was used at the PHY and MAC layers. Each data
point shown represents an average over 5 trials.
A subset of 10 nodes was chosen uniformly at random and
designated as malicious nodes. Upon receiving a packet for
forwarding, a malicious node discarded the packet without
forwarding with probability 0.8. The probability 0.8 was cho-
sen under the assumption that malicious nodes will sometimes
forward packets correctly in order to appear cooperative.
For each packet forwarded by a node, each neighbor was
assumed to observe the forwarding behavior with probability
0.1. When a node i sent a packet to node j for forwarding
and node j failed to forward the packet, node i used this
as evidence of malicious behavior and updated node j’s trust
value accordingly. Conversely, correct forwarding of packets
was used as evidence of good node behavior. In addition to
evidence-based trust, nodes were assumed to have access to a
social network, in which, based on Figure 3, malicious nodes
had trust value 0.6 and valid nodes had trust values chosen
uniformly at random in the interval [0.85, 1].
Four pairs of nodes, designated as (si, di), i = 1, . . . , 4,
were chosen at random from the set of non-malicious nodes to
act as sources (si) and destinations (di). Each source si deter-
mined a set of paths to destination di using a modified version
of the AOMDV routing protocol [6]. The routing protocol was
modified to include trust values in route advertisement packets,
allowing sources to compute the overall trust of a path. Based
on the gathered route and trust information, each source chose
a flow allocation according to (17).
B. Simulation Results
Figures 5a and 5b show the average packet delivery ratio
and throughput, respectively, over time in the case of a static
network. Using social trust, the sources are able to identify
and avoid routes containing malicious nodes, resulting in high
throughput and delivery ratio. When only behavioral trust is
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Fig. 5. Performance of ad hoc networks under different mobility and trust models. (a) In a static network, incorporating social trust increases the packet
delivery ratio compared to behavioral trust. (b) This increase in delivery ratio results in an increase in achieved throughput. (c) Social trust also increases the
probability that packets will avoid malicious nodes. (d), (e) In a network of mobile users, there is a larger improvement in delivery ratio and throughput from
social trust. (f) Probability of avoiding malicious nodes in a mobile environment.
used, however, nodes are unable to accumulate enough evi-
dence to avoid malicious nodes. As a result, the performance
of behavioral trust is comparable to that when no trust metrics
are used.
The impact of malicious users is exacerbated when nodes
are mobile. Due to mobility, each node will have limited time
to observe its neighbors, and hence cannot gather sufficient
evidence to evaluate that node’s reliability. This results in a
further reduction in packet delivery ratio (Fig 5d) and through-
put (Fig 5e). Since the social trust values are independent of
the network topology, incorporating social trust reduces the
level of evidence needed to identify malicious nodes, making
the trust management scheme robust to topology changes.
The impact of mobility is further illustrated in Fig 6a. In
all three scenarios (social and evidence-based trust, evidence-
based trust alone, and no trust management), there is a
decrease in packet delivery ratio as node speed increases.
This is because routes become inactive at a higher rate,
leading to losses when packets are sent over links that no
longer exist. Furthermore, when new routes are selected in
response to topology changes, they may include malicious
nodes. Under the social trust-based method, these malicious
nodes are detected faster, and hence flows are not allocated
along routes containing malicious nodes.
The effect of malicious nodes is more pronounced as the
number of malicious nodes in the system increases (Fig 6b).
When only behavioral trust is used, gathering enough evidence
to avoid all malicious nodes becomes increasingly difficult.
Using social trust mitigates this effect, until the number of
malicious nodes increases to the point where they cannot be
avoided in routing.
In addition to the number of malicious nodes, network
performance is affected by the trust threshold, τT (Fig 6c).
When the threshold is low, any route, even one containing
untrustworthy nodes, can be used for packet delivery, resulting
in malicious behavior and packet drops. As the threshold
increases, the delivery ratio improves; however, if the threshold
is too high, then no nodes will meet the threshold, and hence
no paths can form.
The effect of flow diversity metrics is illustrated in Fig
6d. For both social trust and behavioral trust, increasing flow
diversity leads to a higher packet delivery ratio. The effect
is more pronounced for behavioral trust because packets are
more likely to avoid undetected malicious nodes. Moreover, by
dividing the flow among multiple paths, evidence regarding a
wider collection of nodes is gathered, allowing more rapid
detection of malicious nodes.
In earlier simulations, ISM was incorporated. Figure 7
shows the comparison when ISM is disabled. By incorporating
the metric, the probability of routing packets through a node
with a spoofed identity is greatly reduced (except a random
case for 4 malicious users).
VI. RELATED WORK
There is active ongoing research in establishing trust in the
wireless networks, as part of the broader topic of security in ad
hoc networks [14].An authentication and secure channel estab-
lishment protocol for trust propagation for multihop wireless
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Fig. 6. Effect of network and metric parameters on performance, as measured by packet delivery ratio. (a) Effect of mobility on packet delivery ratio using
different trust metrics. (b) Performance degradation as number of malicious users increases. (c) Effect of trust threshold on performance. (d) Effect of path
diversity on delivery ratio. Nodes move with speed 2 m/s.
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home networks is proposed in [15]. A distributed approach
that establishes reputation-based trust among sensor nodes in
order to identify malfunctioning and malicious sensor nodes
and minimize their impact on applications is proposed in [16].
A formalism to design trust as a computational component is
proposed in [17].
A detailed survey on trust computations in MANETs is
carried out in [2] and on trust management in [18]. These
studies, however, do not consider the use of social trust in an
ad hoc network scenario.
Flow allocation and rate control have been studied using
optimization methods [19]. Dual decomposition methods, in
which constraints for each source are decoupled in order
to develop distributed algorithms, are one widely-used op-
timization method [11]. These methods, however, do not
incorporate the trustworthiness of nodes or the possibility of
node misbehavior, and hence cannot be guaranteed in the
presence of malicious users.
Routing in the presence of malicious nodes has been consid-
ered in a variety of existing works [1], [20]. Malicious nodes
can also assume multiple node identities (the Sybil attack [21],
[22]). Rather than preventing an adversary from disrupting the
routing protocol, however, our focus is on identifying potential
malicious nodes and allocating flows that avoid them.
There have been some efforts to enable social networking in
ad hoc networks [3], [4] but the effect of social relationships on
network performance has not been studied so far. MobiSN [3]
implements all of the core features of a mobile ad hoc social
networking including profile generating, friend matchmaking,
routing control, ad hoc multi-hop text messaging and file
sharing. It is implemented in Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME)
for Bluetooth-enabled mobile phones. Sarigol et al [4] present
Adsocial, designed to run on resource-constrained mobile
devices and share data using a simple and efficient data
piggybacking mechanism.
Our work differs substantially compared to all the related
work mentioned above. Apart from uniquely combining trust
derived from social media with the behavioral trust, we also
incorporate the composed metric into network flow allocation.
In our knowledge this is an unique attempt in this direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a flow allocation problem based
on trust metrics. We introduced a framework for integrating
social trust into mobile ad hoc networks. As a first step, we
demonstrated how to combine the social and observation trust
into a single trust metric and update this value over time.
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We have provided social trust calculation strategy based on
real time traces. A flow allocation optimization framework
was then developed for allocating network flows based on
trust metrics, incorporating trust, throughput, and capacity
constraints. Distributed algorithms for obtaining the optimal
throughput were provided.
We achieve an improvement in terms of throughput with
our proposed approach (social plus behavioral trust) than with
behavioral trust alone. Our scheme is also capable of avoiding
malicious nodes during routing and providing higher packet
delivery ratio as the network operation time increases. This
implies that both behavioral and social trusts are important
and with together they provide a significant performance
improvement. Especially social trust can play a crucial role
in providing a significantly higher overall end-to-end perfor-
mance in mobile networks.
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